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INTRODUCTION
Consider three questions. How would one decide if there was too
much telecommunications surveillance in the United States or too lit-
tle? How would one know if law enforcement was using its surveil-
lance capabilities in the most effective fashion? How would one assess
the impact of this collection of information on civil liberties?
In answering these questions, a necessary step, the logical first
move, would be to examine existing data about governmental surveil-
lance practices and their results. One would also need to examine and
understand how the legal system generated these statistics about tele-
communications surveillance. To build on Patricia Bellia's scholarship,
we can think of each telecommunications surveillance statute as hav-
ing its own "information structure."' Each of these laws comes with
institutional mechanisms that generate information about use of the
respective statute.2 Ideally, the information structure would generate
data sets that would allow the three questions posed above to be an-
swered. Light might also be shed on other basic issues, such as
whether or not the amount of telecommunications surveillance was
increasing or decreasing.
Such rational inquiry about telecommunications surveillance is,
however, largely precluded by the haphazard and incomplete informa-
tion that the government collects about it. In Heart of Darkness,3 Jo-
seph Conrad has his narrator muse on the "blank spaces" on the
globe. Marlowe says:
Now when I was a little chap I had a passion for maps.... At that
time there were many blank spaces on the earth, and when I saw
t Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law, Director, Berkeley Center for Law and
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School, and it benefited there from the support of the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation. It
also received support from the Dean's Research Fund at Brooklyn Law School as well as a
summer research grant from Boalt Hall. Patricia Bellia, Jon Michaels, Chris Slobogin, Stephen
Sugarman, and Frank Zimring offered helpful suggestions.
1 Patricia L. Bellia, The "Lone Wolf" Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Law, 50 Viii L Rev 425,429 (2005).
2 Id.
3 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, in Joseph Conrad, Youth:A Narrative and Two Other
Stories 51 (William Blackwood and Sons 1902).
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one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all look
that) I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will
go there.'
In this essay, we will visit the blank spaces on the map of telecommu-
nications surveillance law.
This essay begins by evaluating the main parts of telecommunica-
tions surveillance law. The critical statutory regulations are: (1) the
Wiretap Act;' (2) the Pen Register Act;6 (3) the Stored Communica-
tions Act' (SCA); (4) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA); and (5) the different provisions for National Security Letters9
(NSLs). Even for these more densely regulated territories, there are
considerable blank areas, which we will explore.
Other parts of the surveillance landscape represent an even
greater expanse of blank spaces on the legal map. There are a number
of "semi-known unknowns" (to coin a phrase); these are kinds of tele-
communications surveillance about which only limited public informa-
tion exists-this surveillance also occurs outside a detailed legal
framework. Specifically, the National Security Administration (NSA)
is now engaged in telecommunications surveillance activities in the
US of unknown dimensions. This surveillance activity poses a consid-
erable threat to the legal structure of existing regulation: it takes place
through secret authorities, rests on secret DOJ opinions, and informa-
tion gathered from it is fed back into the established system, including
the judicial structure for issuing warrants, in a secret fashion.
This essay concludes with the development of the concept of "pri-
vacy theater." Currently, the value of the collection of telecommunica-
tions statistics is largely ritualistic. It serves to create a myth of over-
sight. In addition, the NSA's warrantless surveillance creates a differ-
ent kind of "privacy theater." Here, the ritualization affects the overall
structure of telecommunications surveillance law. The myth here is
4 Id at 59.
5 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title 1II ("Title I11" or "Wiretap
Act"), Pub L No 90-351,82 Stat 211, codified as amended at 18 USCA § 2510 et seq (2007).
6 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Title III ("Pen Register Act"), Pub L
No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848, 1868, codified as amended at 18 USC §§ 3121-27 (2000 & Supp 2002).
7 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Title II ("Stored Communications Act"),
Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848, 1860, codified as amended at 18 USCA § 2701 et seq (2007).
8 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as
amended at 50 USCA § 1801 et seq (2007). FISA regulates collection of intelligence information
about foreign powers and agents of foreign powers operating within the borders of the United
States. In contrast, the Wiretap Act, Pen Register Act, and Stored Communications Act establish
procedures concerning the gathering of information to assist in criminal investigations within the
United States.
9 See, for example, 18 USCA § 2709 (2007).
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that telecommunications surveillance is subject to the rule of law-the
real action increasingly takes place, however, off the mapped spaces
and within secret areas. This essay proposes that we go beyond myth
and rededicate ourselves to the task of creating a telecommunications
surveillance law that minimizes the impact of surveillance on civil lib-
erties and maximizes its effectiveness for law enforcement.
I. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE LAW:
THE STATUTES AND STATISTICS
In the US, different statutes regulate the government's telecom-
munications surveillance. A collection of statistics tracks these stat-
utes; the respective statistics depend on the legal categorization of the
surveillance. The statutes that regulate telecommunications surveillance
in the US are the Wiretap Act, the Pen Register Act, the Stored Com-
munications Act, the Foreign Intelligence Security Act, and the various
NSL provisions. The first three statutes concern domestic surveillance
activities; the last two require a nexus of some kind with a foreign in-
telligence investigation. In Part I, I describe these statutes, consider
how statistics are collected, and examine the available statistics. In
Part II, I evaluate the semi-known unknowns.
A. The Wiretap Act
1. The statute.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act, which is also known
as Title III because of its place within that year's Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act. The enactment of this statute followed two important deci-
sions by the Supreme Court in 1967. In Katz v United States,' the
Court found that warrantless wiretapping of a telephone conversation
violated the Fourth Amendment."H In an earlier opinion that year, Ber-
ger v New York, 2 the Court found that the Fourth Amendment estab-
lished important constitutional standards for authorization of a sur-
veillance warrant.'3 The Court required that a warrant for wiretapping
describe with particularity the conversations sought, be extended only
upon a showing of continued probable cause, and meet other rigorous
procedural standards.
In response to these two decisions, the Wiretap Act prohibits "in-
tercept[ion]" of a "wire or oral communication" without judicial au-
10 389 US 347 (1967).
11 Seeid at 359.
12 388 US 41 (1967).
13 See id at 54-60 (finding that the New York state law under which the warrant in ques-
tion was authorized was "without adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures").
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thorization." In comparison to the other statutes that regulate domes-
tic surveillance, the Wiretap Act sets the highest procedural hurdles
for government. Wiretapping is to be a last resort for law enforcement
officials. Indeed, Congress set a statutory level in the Wiretap Act
higher than the Fourth Amendment's own strictures: the Wiretap Act
requires findings to justify a "super search warrant."'5 This warrant
requires a higher standard of proof, for example, than a warrant for
searches of a house.
The Wiretap Act requires that the government show probable
cause that an "individual is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit" a predicate offense, that is, a serious offense listed in the
Act.1 6 The government also must demonstrate that the surveillance
will capture evidence of this crime." The Wiretap Act calls for a fur-
ther showing that alternatives to interception have failed, are unlikely
to succeed, or will be too dangerous.'8 Even when it is permitted, law
enforcement must seek to minimize surveillance of nonrelevant con-
versations.'9 For example, if a conversation strays into extraneous mat-
ters unrelated to criminal activities, the wiretapping must cease.
There are, however, two important limitations on the Wiretap
Act. First, the Wiretap Act is limited to surveillance of content and
does not regulate the interceptions of "telecommunications attrib-
utes."" Second, it regulates only the capturing of messages contempo-
raneously with their transmission.2' We will analyze these restrictions
below when considering the scope of the Pen Register Act and the
Stored Communications Act.
14 18 USC § 2511(1)(a) (2000) (prohibiting interception); 18 USCA § 2516(1) (2007) (describ-
ing what crimes and offenses wiretaps may be authorized to investigate).
15 See 18 USC § 2518 (2000).
16 18 USC § 2518(3)(a).
17 See 18 USCA § 2516(1) (delineating the various instances when law enforcement may
intercept communications during the course of an investigation); 18 USC § 2518(3)(b) (authoriz-
ing wiretaps when "there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning
that offense will be obtained through such interception").
18 See 18 USC § 2518(3)(c) (requiring that all reasonable and safe investigative procedures
be exhausted before a judge authorizes the interception).
19 See 18 USC § 2518(5) (stating that each interception "shall be conducted in such a way
as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
this chapter").
20 18 USC § 2510(4) (2000) (defining "intercept" as the "acquisition of the contents" of
communications). For a description of "telecommunications attributes," see Part I.B.1.
21 See 18 USC § 2510(12) (2000) (including "transfer[s," though not "storage," in the
definition of "electronic communications"). See also Steve Jackson Games, Inc v United States
Secret Service, 36 F3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir 1994) (holding that interception of an "electronic
communication" under the Wiretap Act requires that the acquisition of the communication be
contemporaneous with its transmission).
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2. The statistics.
The Wiretap Act provides for the collection of detailed statistics
about law enforcement activity. Of all the telecommunications surveil-
lance statutes, it provides for the most complete accounting of behav-
ior. Pursuant to its mandate under the Wiretap Act, the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts ("Administrative Office") has
collected and published the required statistics, and in recent years has
made them available on a dedicated website. These annual reports al-
low analysis of activity by the judiciary, law enforcement, and the tar-
gets of surveillance. We consider each of these aspects of the annual
report in turn.
Regarding the judiciary, information is collected about the num-
ber of wiretap orders.2 This statistic provides the easiest-to-grasp
benchmark from the report, but must be used with caution as a proxy
for the level of telecommunications surveillance. The two major cave-
ats in this regard are, first, that a single order may authorize surveil-
lance on more than one telephone account, and, second, that the Wire-
tap Act permits roving wiretaps.2 In a roving wiretap, surveillance is
centered on a person rather than an account or accounts. The roving
wiretap issue is of somewhat limited significance, however, as their
number remains modest. In 2006, for example, there were fifteen rov-
ing wiretaps, a notable increase from the eight in the preceding year."
Nonetheless, the statistic for the annual number of wiretap orders
measures the output of the court system, but only offers an approxi-
mate sense of the level of surveillance that occurs each year under the
Wiretap Act.
Turning to the numbers, one notes a steady rise over the last dec-
ade in the amount of wiretap orders. The number has increased from
1,186 in 1997, to 1,491 in 2001, to 1,839 in 2006. This represents an
22 See 18 USC § 2519 (2000) (requiring the issuing or denying judge to report all intercep-
tion orders to the Administrative Office).
23 For a discussion of roving wiretaps and the ability of a single order to authorize surveillance
on multiple accounts, see Paul M. Schwartz, German and US Telecommunications Privacy Law:
Legal Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 Hastings L J 751,762-63 (2003).
24 Administrative Office, Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving Interception of Wire, Oral, or
Electronic Communications ("2006 Wiretap Report") 9 (Apr 2007), online at http://www.us-
courts.gov/wiretap06/contents.html (visited Jan 12, 2008).
25 Administrative Office, Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving Interception of Wire, Oral, or
Electronic Communications ("1997 Wiretap Report") 14 table 2 (Apr 1998), online at http://
www.uscourts.gov/wiretap/contents.html (visited Jan 12, 2008); Administrative Office, Report of
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for Orders
Authorizing or Approving Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications ("2001 Wire-
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increase of almost 55 percent. Moreover, wiretap orders over the last
decade have increasingly become a phenomenon of state rather than
federal courts. In 1997, there were 617 state orders and 569 federal or-
ders.26 In 2001, the breakdown was 486 federal orders and 1,005 state
orders.17 In 2006, there were 461 federal orders and 1,378 state orders."
Regarding law enforcement, the official reporting reveals that
almost all wiretap orders are sought and granted for drug-related
crimes. In 2006, 80 percent of applications for intercepts, federal and
state, cited a drug offense as the most serious crime under investiga-
tion." The next largest categories are racketeering and homi-
cide/assault, which were each specified in 5 percent and 6 percent, re-
spectively, of applications."
Moreover, wiretapping is primarily a phenomenon of a few juris-
dictions. At the federal and state levels in 2006, four states, California
(430 orders), New York (377), New Jersey (189), and Florida (98) ac-
counted for 59 percent of all wiretap orders." This pattern of use is
likely independent of crime patterns, but rather reflects local law en-
forcement practice norms, including prosecutorial familiarity with the
complex set of legal requirements for obtaining wiretap orders.
There is a separate reporting requirement for law enforcement
encounters with encrypted communications. Beginning in the 1970s,
government officials became concerned that commercial encryption
software might hamstring law enforcement." Although public access
to encryption remains largely unregulated, concerns persisted about it
becoming too powerful. As Senator Patrick Leahy remarked in 1999
in introducing a statute that amended the Wiretap Act to require en-
hanced reporting, "Encryption technology is critical to protect sensi-
tive computer and online information. Yet, the same technology poses
challenges to law enforcement when it is exploited by criminals to
hide evidence or the fruits of criminal activities."33 Since its 1999
amendment, the Wiretap Act has provided yearly evidence regarding
tap Report") 15 table 2 (May 2002), online at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretapOl/contentshtmi
(visited Jan 12, 2008); 2006 Wiretap Report at 15 table 2 (cited in note 24).
26 1997 Wiretap Report at 14 table 2 (cited in note 25).
27 2001 Wiretap Report at 15 table 2 (cited in note 25).
28 2006 Wiretap Report at 15 table 2 (cited in note 24).
29 See id at 19 table 3.
30 See id.
31 See id at 15-17 table 2.
32 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and
Encryption 67-85 (MIT 2d ed 2007).
33 145 Cong Rec S 15227-28 (Dec 3, 1999) (discussing the Continued Reporting of Inter-
cepted Wire, Oral, and Electronic Communications Act).
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the ongoing contest between law enforcement's decryption technol-
ogy and targets' encryption software.3
The results are clear-targets rarely use encryption, and it almost
never provides difficulties for law enforcement. In 2006, for example,
law enforcement encountered no instances of encryption in wiretaps
terminated that year and in none of these cases did it prevent officials
from obtaining the plain text of communication. '" Encryption has al-
most never prevented law enforcement from accessing the plain text
of communications.3
On the target side, a total of 92 percent of all wiretaps in 2006 in-
volved mobile communication devices. 3 In 2006, on average, a law
enforcement use of an interception order captured the communica-
tions of 122 persons per order.3 The average number of communica-
tions intercepted was 2,685 per wiretap." The average percentage of
incriminating intercepts per wiretap order in 2006 was 20 percent,'
and this last statistic gives one pause. To be as clear as possible, this
statistic is not inconsistent with each wiretap order leading to the col-
lection of some incriminating intercepts. It means that on average 80
percent of the communications intercepted per order did not contain
anything incriminating.
Is the glass 20 percent full or 80 percent empty? The Wiretap Act
requires strict minimalization of the collection of extraneous informa-
tion once surveillance occurs. Either these requirements are not being
followed or inadequate procedures are in place. When 80 percent of
all wiretaps fail to discover incriminating evidence, law enforcement
officials are not obeying the statutory requirement of minimalization.
Finally, the 2006 Wiretap Report details the results of wiretaps in
terms of arrests as well as the number of motions made and granted to
suppress with respect to interceptions." Wiretaps terminated in 2006
34 See 18 USC § 2519(2)(b)(iv) (stating that the government must report "the number of
orders in which encryption was encountered and whether such encryption prevented law en-
forcement from obtaining the plain text of communications").
35 See 2006 Wiretap Report at 12 (cited in note 24).
36 In 2005, a state law enforcement authority reported its inability to decipher an en-
crypted communication from a wiretap in an earlier year. Administrative Office, Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for Orders Au-
thorizing or Approving Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications ("2005 Wiretap
Report") 11 (Apr 2006), online at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap05/contents.html (visited Jan
12, 2008). One wonders if possibly superior federal decryption resources would have overcome
the obstacles to obtaining plain text in that case.
37 2006 Wiretap Report at 8 (cited in note 24).
38 Id at 23 table 4.
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 See id at 30 table 6.
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led to the arrest of 4,376 persons and the conviction of 711 persons."
As arrests and convictions often do not occur within the same year as
the use of an interception device, these numbers will increase over the
next several years. In addition, law enforcement officials were able to
draw on information gathered through wiretaps to impound large
amounts of vehicles, weapons, and illegal drugs. Regarding motions to
suppress, the Administrative Office does not provide this information
in its 2006 summary report, but it may be calculated from documents
that prosecutors file with the Office. In 2006, of the 283 motions to
suppress 7 were granted and 61 were reported as pending. 3
B. The Pen Register Act
1. The statute.
As noted above, the Wiretap Act contains important limitations
on its scope, including a focus solely on the surveillance of content. It
defines content as "any information concerning the substance, pur-
port, or meaning" of "any wire, oral or electronic communication."44
For example, during a conversation on a telephone, spoken words are
transmitted over a wire, and these words constitute its "substance, pur-
port, or meaning.'"4' A variety of other information falls outside this
category; we can refer to these data as "telecommunication attributes."
Some of this information already existed in 1968 at the time of
the enactment of the Wiretap Act; technological changes also have
created new and more detailed kinds of telecommunication attributes.
Moreover, at least some of this information falls outside of the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. In 1979, the Court decided Smith v
Maryland," a case involving the police's use of a "pen register., 7 This
device permits the recording of telephone numbers that one dials. A
similar machine, the "trap and trace" device, is used to capture the
numbers received by a telephone. In Smith, the Supreme Court re-
jected the plaintiffs argument that the Fourth Amendment placed
restrictions on law enforcement's access to information captured by
either device. The Smith Court ruled that such information was non-
42 Id at 39 table 9.
43 See id at 88-115 table A-2, 246-65 table B-2.
44 18 USC § 2510(8) (2000).
45 Id.
46 442 US 735 (1979).
47 18 USC § 2510(8).
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content information in which no constitutionally cognizable "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" existed. 8
Congress reacted in 1986 to the Smith decision and the gap in the
Wiretap Act's coverage by enacting the Pen Register Act. 9 This stat-
ute regulates law enforcement's use of pen registers and trap and
trace devices. Recently, the Patriot Act" amended the Pen Register
Act to include "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information"
("DRAS information") in its definition of the information that falls
under the statute, which previously focused on "numbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted."5' IP addresses and email addressing informa-
tion ("to" and "from" lines on email and routing) are an example of
DRAS information.52
Pursuant to the Pen Register Act, law enforcement can obtain in-
formation through a lower standard than the Wiretap Act's super-
warrant requirement." Indeed, to anticipate the next section, the Pen
Register Act also provides less rigorous requirements than the Stored
Communication Act. Law enforcement officers can obtain informa-
tion that falls under the Pen Register Act after filing an order with a
court that states that the "information likely to be obtained ... is rele-
vant to an ongoing criminal investigation."4 The Pen Register Act
does not authorize judicial investigation of the substantive merits of
this request. As long as the procedural requirements of the Pen Regis-
ter Act are met, the court is to approve requests filed with it."
2. The statistics.
Like the Wiretap Act, although in a less detailed manner, the Pen
Register Act requires collection of information about its use.6 Taken
48 442 US at 743-46 ("We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability entertained
no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his
expectation was not 'legitimate."').
49 See Pen Register Act, 100 Stat at 1868.
50 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act"), Pub L No 107-56,115 Stat 272.
51 Id § 216(a), 115 Stat at 288-90, codified at 18 USC § 3121(c) (2000 & Supp 2001).
52 See Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg, and Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law
296 (Aspen 2d ed 2006). See also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot
Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw U L Rev 607, 636-42 (2003) (characterizing the Patriot
Act amendments to the Pen Register Act as merely the natural extension of existing law to
emerging technologies).
53 See 18 USC § 3123 (2000 & Supp 2001) (denoting the elements required to obtain a
surveillance order under the Pen Register Act).
54 Id.
55 See id (directing the court to enter an order authorizing pen register or trap and trace
devices where "the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be ob-
tained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation").
56 18 USC § 3126 (2000) (directing the attorney general to report to Congress).
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as a whole, the Pen Register's reporting requirements fall into a mid-
dle ground: less detailed than the Wiretap Act's, but more detailed
than the Stored Communications Act's almost nonexistent reporting
requirements. We first take a moment to explore the Pen Register
Act's reporting requirements as expressed on paper-then we will
analyze the most current statistical information available.
First, the Pen Register Act report requires a list of the period of
interceptions authorized by order, and the number and duration of
any extensions of the orders. 7 Recall that the Pen Register Act regu-
lates information that is captured in transmission. Thus, similar to in-
formation collected under the Wiretap Act, this reporting requirement
addresses the temporal dimension of surveillance. How long did the
surveillance activity last?
Second, the report spells out the specific offense for which the
Pen Register Act order was granted.' As in the Wiretap Act, this re-
quirement acts as a check to ensure that the targets were involved in a
predicate offense. Third, the report sets out the number of investiga-
tions involved." This statistic gives a sense of the scope of the underly-
ing law enforcement activity. Fourth, the report explains the number
and nature of the facilities affected.6° Fifth, it identifies the district of
the applying law enforcement agency making the application as well
as the person authorizing the order."
At this juncture, something surprising can be reported: Pen Reg-
ister Act reports are not publicly available and generally disappear
into a congressional vacuum. At a presentation of this paper in June
2007, however, at The University of Chicago Law School's Surveil-
lance Symposium, sponsored by the John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics and The University of Chicago Law Review, I discovered
that Professor Bellia had succeeded in obtaining the official reports to
Congress for 1999-2003 from the DOJ's Office of Legislative Affairs.62
57 Id.
58 18 USC § 3126(2).
59 18 USC § 3126(3).
60 18 USC § 3126(4).
61 18 USC § 3126(5).
62 Professor Bellia has generously shared these reports with me; I have posted these re-
ports on my website at http://www.paulschwartz.net/penregister-report.pdf ("Pen Register Re-
ports") (visited Jan 12, 2008) and shared them with interested academics and nongovernmental
organizations. Until Professor Bellia was able to obtain these reports, the most recent publicly
available Pen Register Act information was from 1998. For five years in the 1990s, from 1994 to
1998, a staff attorney at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) with contacts on
Capitol Hill found out the number of (1) pen register orders; and (2) extensions to the original
orders. EPIC still posts these old statistics on its website. See Approvals for Federal Pen Registers
and Trap and Trace Devices 1987-1998, EPIC, online at http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/
stats/penreg.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
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Interestingly enough, the reports do not appear to have been made
annually, but as one document dump with five years of reports in No-
vember 2004.63 The reports also fail to detail all of the information that
the Pen Register Act requires to be shared with Congress.
This state of affairs is strange; it is somewhat similar to the ar-
chaic conditions prior to the New Deal and creation of the Federal
Register and other methods for orderly publication of governmental
records. Moreover, the lack of congressional interest in timely receipt
of these reports is puzzling. There is, for example, no indication that
Congress received the pen register reports for 2004, 2005, and 2006.
This essay returns to this gap in knowledge in Part III below, where it
develops the concept of "privacy theater."
Regarding the five years of pen/trap reports, a caveat is also im-
portant. These statistics only report federal use of these devices." In
comparison, the wiretap statistics list wiretaps in both federal and state
jurisdictions." If the trend for pen/trap statistics is similar to wiretap
statistics, there is currently more state use of these devices than fed-
eral. Yet, no data are available regarding state pen/trap statistics.
As for the available federal statistics for pen/trap devices, these
indicate a gradual decline in the amount of orders from 1999 to 2002,
and then a large increase in 2003. In 1999, there were 6,502 orders; in
2000, 6,079; in 2001, 5,683; and in 2002, 5,311. Then, there was a dra-
matic rise in 2003 with 7,258 pen/trap orders. The 2003 amount repre-
sents an 11.6 percent increase in federal use of pen/trap orders over
the five-year period that began in 1999, and, more dramatically, a 29.9
percent increase from the preceding year. As a point of comparison,
federal use of wiretaps declined over a similar period between 1999
and 2006.67
63 See Pen Register Reports (cited in note 62).
64 See id.
65 See, for example, 2006 Wiretap Report at 19 table 3 (cited in note 24). State regulation of
pen registers and trap and trace devices forms a diverse lot. Some state laws are modeled on the
federal law. Others, as in California and New York, set a higher standard and require a judicial
hearing, similar to when the government makes a wiretap request. James G. Carr and Patricia L.
Bellia, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 4:81 (West 2007). See also 86 Op Cal Atty Gen 198,
Opinion No 03-406 6 (Dec 18, 2003) (finding that the California Constitution requires a judicial
hearing before installment of a pen register by law enforcement and that court procedures in the
federal pen register statute do not meet this state standard).
66 See Pen Register Reports at 5-9 (cited in note 62). The federal statistics also contain a
notable internal gap: the DOJ reported in 2001 that it was "not able to obtain ... statistics from
the former INS," which had become part of the Department of Homeland Security. In 1999, the
INS reported twenty-one pen/trap orders; in 2000, it reported ten.
67 Compare Administrative Office, Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving Interception of
Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications ("1999 Wiretap Report") 14 table 2 (Apr 2000), online at
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C. The Stored Communications Act
1. The statute.
As we have seen, the Wiretap Act's first limitation is its applica-
bility solely to the content of communication. Regarding its second
limitation, the Wiretap Act regulates only the "interception" of a
communication during the period of its "transmission." Interception,
in the sense of the Act, means capturing the contents of a communica-
tion as it is being transmitted with any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." A transmission represents the contemporaneous, or near-
contemporaneous, expression of a communication by the sender and
its receipt by the recipient. A speaker talks on the phone, the listener
listens: the event occurs in real time.
Many other kinds of telecommunications occur in asynchronous
fashion. For example, sending an email may be the most ubiquitous
form of telecommunications in the US today. Yet, an email is in trans-
mission-at least as the term is understood under the Wiretap Act-
for only a short period. Transmission is the time that it takes from
clicking on the "send" command to the moment the message arrives at
the server of the recipient's ISP.70 Of course, an email is only accessible
to the individual to whom it is sent once downloaded from the server.
Yet, its "transmission" for legal purposes has ended before this final
stage, which means that the Wiretap Act will almost never be impli-
cated by internet communications. The annual statistics collected un-
der the Wiretap Act confirm this view."
The process for obtaining access to information under the Stored
Communications Act is generally less rigorous than under the Wiretap
Act.12 Even under its strictest requirements, the Stored Communica-
tions Act does not compel use of a "super search warrant." This statute
sets up a sliding scale of mechanisms to compel disclosure based on
different factors." Its requirements range from a "probable cause"
search warrant without notice to the subscriber or customer at the
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap99/contents.html (visited Jan 12, 2008) (reporting 601 federal inter-
cept orders), with 2006 Wiretap Report at 15 table 2 (cited in note 24) (reporting only 461 orders).
68 18 USC § 2511(1)(b) (2000).
69 See 18 USC § 2510(4).
70 See United States v Steiger, 318 F3d 1039, 1049-50 (11th Cir 2003) (noting that "very few
seizures of electronic communications from computers will constitute 'interceptions').
71 In 2006, for example, less than 1 percent of all wiretap orders involved "transmissions via
computer such as electronic mail." 2006 Wiretap Report at 11 (cited in note 24).
72 For a lucid discussion of the privacy protections of the Stored Communications Act, see
Orin S. Kerr, Computer Crime Law 504-07 (West 2006) (listing and commenting on the various
personal privacy exceptions allowable under the Stored Communications Act).
73 See 18 USC § 2703(b)(1) (2000 & Supp 2001) (denoting the different levels of disclosure).
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high end to a subpoena with notice at the low end." Moreover, the
Stored Communications Act is not restricted to a set of predicate of-
fenses. Rather, law enforcement officials can access information pursu-
ant to the Stored Communications Act for any criminal investigation."
2. The statistics.
As less electronic information than ever before is "content" that
is in "transmission," the Stored Communications Act is the most im-
portant form of legal regulation for the government when it engages
in domestic law enforcement surveillance. Yet, there are almost no
official statistics collected about the government's use of this statute.
In contrast to the Wiretap Act's detailed reporting provisions, the
Stored Communications Act contains only a single reporting require-
ment-and one that only addresses the use of a single statutory excep-
tion, which regards disclosure in an emergency.
In 2001, the Patriot Act added this emergency exception and the
concomitant reporting requirement as amendments to the Stored
Communications Act. The 2006 amendments permit voluntary disclo-
sures to the government when "the provider, in good faith, believes
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury
to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications
relating to the emergency." 6 The attorney general is to file a report on
emergency disclosures with the House and Senate Judiciary Commit-
tees." The reporting requirement is intended to provide a check
against misuse of the emergency exception. So far, so good-except
this information is not publicly available at present.
D. Foreign Intelligence Information: FISA and the National Security
Letter Provisions
We now shift our attention from statutes that authorize collection
of telecommunications information for domestic law enforcement
purposes to those that permit it for intelligence purposes.
74 See id.
75 See 18 USC § 2703(d) (2000 & Supp 2001) (requiring a judge to issue a warrant for
surveillance whenever the relevant governmental entity demonstrates that there are "reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation").
76 Patriot Act § 212, 115 Stat at 284, codified as amended at 18 USCA § 2702(b)(8).
77 18 USCA § 2702(d) (requiring the attorney general to report: (1) the number of ac-
counts of voluntary disclosures received under the emergency exception; and (2) a summary of
the basis for disclosures in those instances where emergency disclosure was made but the inves-
tigation pertaining to those disclosures was closed without the filing of criminal charges).
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1. The statutes: FISA and National Security Letters.
a) FISA. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act"8 provides
the chief statutory regulation for the government's collection of in-
formation about foreign intelligence within the US. The enactment of
this statute followed the Supreme Court's decision in United States v
United States District Court79 ("Keith") in 1972, and investigations in
1975-1976 in the Senate and House of violations of civil liberties by
the US intelligence community.
In Keith, the Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment
required a neutral magistrate to issue warrants for domestic national
security wiretaps. The Keith Court refused to permit "unreviewed ex-
ecutive discretion" in light of the "pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech."" It also explicitly declined to address the constitutional re-
quirements for surveillance of the agents of foreign powers.81 Subse-
quent to this decision, congressional investigations by Senator Frank
Church and Representative Otis Pike revealed a long history of intel-
ligence abuses. These included national intelligence agencies wiretap-
ping US citizens without judicial warrants.8
After over a half-decade of congressional discussion and debate,
Congress enacted FISA in 1978. FISA governs when foreign intelli-
gence gathering is "a significant purpose" of the investigation. 3 Pursu-
ant to FISA, the government may both engage in real-time electronic
surveillance and gain access to stored electronic communications." To
do so, however, it must meet statutory procedures and requirements.
A special federal court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) reviews the government's requests for FISA warrants."
The FISC proceeds ex parte; the DOJ makes applications to it on be-
78 FISA regulates the collection of intelligence information about foreign powers and
agents of foreign powers operating within the borders of the United States. In contrast, the Wire-
tap Act, Pen Register Act, and Stored Communications Act establish procedures concerning the
gathering of information to assist in criminal investigations within the United States.
79 407 US 297 (1972).
80 Idat317.
81 See id at 321-22.
82 United States Senate, 2 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 105-07 (GPO 1976). The investigators also
revealed other abuses, including: the IRS developing intelligence files on more than 10,000 indi-
viduals between 1969-1973 due to their political beliefs; the CIA opening nearly a quarter of a
million first class letters in the United States between 1953-1973 and creating a computerized
index of nearly 1.5 million names; and the US Army maintaining intelligence files on an esti-
mated 100,000 Americans between the mid-1960s and 1971. Id at 95.
83 50 USC § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000 & Supp 2001).
84 50 USC § 1802(a)(1)(A) (2000).
85 50 USC § 1803(a) (2000 & Supp 2001).
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half of the CIA and other agencies." Applications must include a
statement of facts justifying the government's belief that the target is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and, in cases of foreign
surveillance, that the foreign power or its agent is using "each of the
facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed.""7
The government may appeal decisions of the FISC to a three-judge
appellate court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.-
b) NSLs. In addition to FISA, several statutes permit the FBI
to obtain personal information from third parties through National
Security Letters." An NSL is a written directive by the FBI in cases
involving national security; it does not require judicial review. NSLs
extend to financial records, certain aspects of credit reports, and, of
particular interest for this essay, certain telecommunications attributes.
The relevant NSL provision allows the FBI to obtain "subscriber in-
formation and toll billing records information, or electronic communi-
cation transactional records."% As the Inspector General of the DOJ
explains, the kinds of information that the FBI can obtain about elec-
tronic communications through NSLs include: "[h]istorical informa-
tion on telephone calls made and received from a specified number,
... and local and long distance billing records"; "[e]lectronic commu-
nication transactional records (e-mails), including e-mail addresses";
"screen names"; and "billing records and method of payment."9 The
government may not use a NSL to obtain the content of telecommu-
nications, whether of telephone calls or emails."
The Patriot Act changed then-existing authority and expanded
the FBI's authority to obtain information through NSLs.93 First, it low-
ered the threshold for issuing an NSL by eliminating the requirement
that the sought-after information involve a foreign power or agent of
a foreign power. ' The new test is that of "relevancy" to an investiga-
tion to protect against international terrorism or espionage." Second,
86 See 50 USCA § 1804(a); 50 USCA 1842(d).
87 50 USCA § 1804(a).
88 50 Usc § 1803(b) (2000).
89 For an overview of NSLs, see DOJ, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters ("OIG Report on NSLs") x-xiv
(Mar 2007), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
90 18 USC § 2709(a) (2000).
91 OIG Report on NSLs at xii (cited in note 89).
92 Id at 14 (distinguishing the subscriber, billing, and transactional information accessible
with an NSL from "the content[sl of telephone conversations or email communications").
93 See Patriot Act § 505, 115 Stat at 365. For a general discussion of how the Patriot Act
expanded the FBI's authority to access information using NSLs, see OIG Report on NSLs at 8-10
(cited in note 89).
94 See 18 USC § 2709(b) (2000 & Supp 2001).
95 See 18 USC § 2709(b)(1).
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the Patriot Act decentralized authority to issue an NSL from a limited
group of officials in FBI headquarters in Washington, DC to the head
of any of the FBI's fifty-six field offices.6
A recipient of an NSL may petition a court for an order to set
aside or modify the request. The recipient of an NSL also faces a
strict nondisclosure requirement, a gag order, which prohibits "dis-
clos[ure] to any person" that the FBI "has sought or obtained access
to information or records under this section."9 A recipient of an NSL
published an anonymous op-ed in the Washington Post in March 2007
providing a catalogue of the costs of NSL secrecy. Beyond the consid-
erable personal stress that this requirement imposes, the author noted
that his silence deprives the public of information about misuse of
NSL authority. As the anonymous author states, "[b]ased on the con-
text of the demand-a context that the FBI still won't let me discuss
publicly-I suspected that the FBI was abusing its power and that the
letter sought information to which the FBI was not entitled." In Sep-
tember 2007, a federal district court found the NSL nondisclosure
provisions unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine."* The court also stayed its decision for
ninety days to allow the government to appeal or pursue other courses
of action."' In reaction to an earlier opinion in 2006 by the same court
holding the NSL provisions unconstitutional, Congress had revised the
statute's nondisclosure provisions. 112
2. The statistics.
a) FISA. FISA requires annual reports to be filed with Con-
gress and the Administrative Office. These reports provide skeletal
96 See 18 USC § 2709(b).
97 18 USCA § 3511(a) (2007) (providing for judicial review of NSLs and noting that "[tihe
court may modify or set aside the request if compliance would be unreasonable, oppressive, or
otherwise unlawful").
98 18 USCA § 2709(c)(1) (2007).
99 Anonymous, My National Security Letter Gag Order, Wash Post A17 (Mar 23,2007). The
lack of public information allowed the FBI to continue its behavior: "Without the gag orders
issued on recipients of the letters, it is doubtful that the FBI would be able to abuse the NSL
power the way that it did." Id.
100 Doe v Gonzales, 500 F Supp 2d 379,387 (SDNY 2007).
101 Id at 424.
102 Congress made the initial changes in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthori-
zation Act of 2005 ("Patriot Reauthorization Act") § 128, Pub L No 109-177, 120 Stat 192, 228-29,
(2006), codified at 18 USCA § 3511 (2007). Congress then made additional revisions in the USA
PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 §§ 4-5, Pub L No 109-178,
120 Stat 278, 280-81, codified at 18 USCA § 2709(c)(4), (f) (2007). The earlier opinion from the
district court was Doe v Ashcroft, 334 F Supp 2d 471, 494-511 (SDNY 2004). A second district
court had also enjoined the government from enforcing the nondisclosure requirement of the
statute. Doe v Gonzales, 386 F Supp 2d 66, 82 (D Conn 2005).
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information, namely, "the total number of applications made for or-
ders" of electronic surveillance and "the total number of such orders
and extensions either granted, modified or denied."'' 3 FISA also re-
quires the Attorney General to file reports on a semi-annual basis
with the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence.' These
reports are to concern "all uses of pen register and trap and trace de-
vices" pursuant to FISA, including the total number of applications
made and approved.' ° This information is made publicly available.
FISA reports reveal a dramatic increase in FISA orders. In 1997,
there were 748 orders granted; in 2002, there were 932; in 2006, there
were 2,181.'06 The increase over the last decade was 342 percent. These
statistics are less than helpful, however, in understanding telecommu-
nications surveillance for two reasons.
First, the numbers represent applications for both electronic and
physical searches with no further breakdown given. In 1994, Congress
amended FISA to allow physical searches as well as electronic ones.'07
The annual FISA reports henceforth lumped together both kinds of
surveillance into one figure. Second, and even more significantly, these
reports considerably undercount counterterrorism electronic surveil-
lance because of one "semi-known unknown" to be discussed below:
the Bush administration has carried out electronic surveillance of the
type that FISA circumscribes, but without following this statute's re-
quirements and without revealing the extent and precise nature of
these activities.
The available evidence, nonetheless, indicates that 2006 was a
highly active year for input from the FISA court. During this year, the
FISC denied five of the government's applications, a number of refusals
exceeded only in 1999. ' The court also made substantive modifications
to seventy-three proposed orders and denied one application in part. "9
b) NSLs. In reauthorizing the Patriot Act in 2005, Congress
required two important kinds of information to be released about
NSLs. First, it expanded the existing reporting requirements. Prior and
subsequent to the Patriot Act, the FBI provided classified, semi-annual
103 50 USC § 1807 (2000).
104 50 USCA § 1808(a)(1) (2007).
105 50 USCA § 1846 (2007).
106 DOJ, Office of Legislative Affairs, Report to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives ("2006 FISA Report") 1 (Apr 27, 2007), online at http://www.fas.org/irp
/agency/doj/fisa/2006rept.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). For the 1997, 2002, and 2006 reports, among
others, see http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (visited Jan 12,2008).
107 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L No 103-359, 108 Stat 3423,
3443 (1994), codified as amended at 50 USCA § 1821-29 (2007).
108 See 2006 FISA Report at 1-2 (cited in note 106).
109 Id.
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reports to Congress on the FBI's use of NSLs."' The Patriot Reauthori-
zation Act required the FBI to also issue annual public reports on the
FBI's requests for NSLs."' Second, it required the inspector general of
the DOJ to carry out an audit of the FBI's use of NSLs.
t 2
The first kind of reporting is similar to that under FISA-it calls
for release of a limited amount of statistical information. The attorney
general is to submit "an aggregate report" to Congress that sets forth
"with respect to the preceding year the total number of requests"
made pursuant to NSL authority.'3 The NSL report for 2005 listed
9,254 NSLs that included US persons, and 3,501 different US persons
implicated by these requests."' Yet, as the audit by the Inspector Gen-
eral reveals, these numbers substantially underreported the actual
number of NSLs that the FBI issued. Instead of 9,254 NSL requests in
2005, the FBI issued 47,221 NSL requests."'
The flaws with the reporting begin with the explicit statutory ex-
clusion for the public reports regarding "the number of requests for
subscriber information.'. 6 Subscriber data are of particular interest for
law enforcement, and hence, this omission skews the publicly released
numbers downward and creates a misleading impression of the level of
NSL activity. In addition, wide-reaching flaws existed in the FBI's track-
ing of NSLs. These involved shortcomings in the way that "the FBI re-
cords, forwards, and accounts for information about its use of NSLs."
' '
1
7
We now reach the second kind of reporting, which comes through
the audit requirement. In its Patriot Reauthorization Act, Congress re-
quired a detailed examination by the DOJ's inspector general "of the
effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use" of NSLs."8
This kind of audit proved valuable in March 2006 when the Inspector
General issued the first part of his review of the FBI's use of NSLs. As
noted, the Inspector General found a dramatic underreporting of NSLs.
Indeed, the total number of NSL requests between 2003 and 2005 to-
110 18 USC § 2709(e).
111 Patriot Reauthorization Act § 118, 120 Stat at 217-18 (noting that "[tihe report under
this section shall be submitted in unclassified form").
112 Id § 119, 120 Stat at 219-21 (setting out requirements and submission dates for the in-
spector general's audits).
113 Id § 118(c)(1), 120 Stat at 218.
114 Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives 5 (April 28, 2006), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/
nsd/foia/reading-room/2005fisa-ltr.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
115 OIG Report on NSLs at xix (cited in note 89).
116 Patriot Reauthorization Act § 118(c)(1)(A), 120 Stat at 218. For a discussion, see OIG
Report on NSLs at xix (cited in note 89).
117 OIG Report on NSLs at xvi (cited in note 89).
118 Patriot Reauthorization Act § 119(a), 120 Stat at 219.
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taled at least 143,074."9 Of these NSLs requests, as the Inspector Gen-
eral found, "[t]he overwhelming majority ... sought telephone toll bill-
ing records information, subscriber information (telephone or e-mail)
or electronic communication transactional records under the [Elec-
tronic Communications Protection Act] NSL statute.' 2.
The Inspector General also carried out a limited audit of investi-
gative case files, and found that 22 percent of them contained at least
one violation of investigative guidelines or procedures that was not
reported to any of the relevant internal authorities at the FBI.'2 ' Fi-
nally, the Inspector General also found over seven hundred instances
in which the FBI obtained telephone records and subscriber informa-
tion from telephone companies based on the use of a so-called "exi-
gent letter" authority." This authority, absent from the statute, was
invented by the FBI's Counterterrorism Division.'23 Having devised
this new power, the FBI did not set limits on its use, or track how it
was employed. Witnesses told the Inspector General that many of
these letters "were not issued in exigent circumstances, and the FBI
was unable to determine which letters were sent in emergency circum-
stances due to inadequate recordkeeping."'2'
II. SEMI-KNOWN UNKNOWNS: NSA DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
NSA surveillance has now moved into the US. An article in the
New York Times in December 2005 revealed that the NSA was inter-
cepting communications where one party was located outside the US
and another party was inside the US.'2 After this story broke, Presi-
dent George W. Bush and then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
confirmed, in general terms, this NSA activity. ' In addition, the NSA
is likely accessing purely international calls (foreign-to-foreign) that
pass through telecommunications switches physically located in the
119 OIG Report on NSLs at xlv (cited in note 89).
120 Id.
121 Id at xxxi.
122 Id at xxxv-xxxvi.
123 See id at xxxv-xxxvii.
124 Id at xxxiv. Indeed, "in most instances, there was no documentation associating the re-
quests with pending national security investigations." Id.
125 See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, NY
Times Al (Dec 16,2005).
126 Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to Pat Roberts, Chair-
man, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, et al ("Moschella DOJ Letter") 1 (Dec 22,2005),
online at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/dojl22205.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) ("As de-
scribed by the President, the NSA intercepts certain international communications into and out
of the United States of people linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.").
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US.'2 There also has been some evidence, although at present incon-
clusive, that the NSA is accessing purely domestic communications-
and without judicial warrants. In August 2007, in a few days of feverish
activity immediately before its summer recess, Congress enacted
amendments to FISA through the Protect America Act of 2007;'2 this
law formally authorized one or more of these semi-known unknowns.
We begin this tale, still shrouded in secrecy, at the beginning. Ac-
cording to media reports, President Bush signed a secret executive
order shortly after the terrorist attack on 9/11; the order authorized
NSA access to foreign transit data routed through the US as well as
certain foreign-domestic communications.2 Due to the growth of fi-
ber optic networks and the digitalization of telecommunications traf-
fic, exclusively international emails or telephone calls are now routed
through telecommunications switches located in the US.' The presi-
dential authorization for the program or programs has been shared
neither with Congress nor the public. The DOJ opinions said to de-
clare the activities lawful remain secret.' President Bush also has
blocked the granting of security clearances to lawyers at the DOJ's
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) who were set to investi-
gate the role of DOJ officials in authorizing warrantless NSA surveil-
lance. 1 2 Attorneys at OPR have never been denied security clearances
in the past. This investigation was, however, reopened by Attorney
General Michael Mukasey, the successor to Alberto Gonzales; the
White House refused comment as to whether President Bush had
"changed his mind about granting access to classified information."'"
127 See James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administra-
tion 49-51 (Free 2006) (describing the growth of transit traffic-purely international calls passing
through the United States-and how the NSA gained access to the transit traffic).
128 Pub L No 110-55, 121 Stat 552, codified at 50 USCA §§ 1805a-c (2007).
129 See Risen and Lichtblau, Bush Lets US Spy on Callers, NY Times at Al (cited in note 125).
130 See id.
131 See id. For the legal justification of the program to Congress, see Moschella DOJ Letter
at 2 (cited in note 126) (noting that the president's responsibility to protect the nation "includes
the authority to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States, as
[several courts] to have addressed the issue have concluded").
132 Murray Waas, Aborted DOJ Probe Probably Would Have Targeted Gonzales, Natl J 35-36
(Mar 15, 2007), online at http://newsnationaljournal.com/articles/0315njl.htm (visited Jan 12, 2008)
("Bush personally intervened to sideline the Justice Department probe in April 2006 by taking the
unusual step of denying investigators the security clearances necessary for their work.").
133 See id ("Michael Shaheen, who headed OPR from its inception until 1997, told [the
magazine] ... that his staff 'never ever was denied a clearance."'). Indeed, the Bush administra-
tion granted security clearances to "a large team" of prosecutors and FBI agents, in the words of
the chief of OPR, to investigate the leaks of information that led to the New York Times's disclo-
sure of the program's existence. Id.
134 Evan Perez, Mukasey Reopens Internal Probe, Wall St J A8 (Nov 14, 2007) (discussing
the DOJ's perceived willingness to operate without yielding to White House pressure as a result
of a new Attorney General).
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During the debate about the Protect America Act, the Administration
continued to deny congressional requests for information about the
NSA's warrantless surveillance activities.'35
There is also the possibility that in one of its US-based programs,
the NSA is engaged in surveillance of purely domestic communica-
tions. In May 2006, USA Today revealed an additional NSA program
in which at least one telephone company, AT&T, was providing the
NSA with the telephone calling records of tens of millions of Ameri-
cans. ' This program is said to involve access to domestic telecommu-
nications attributes. USA Today reported, "The NSA program reaches
into homes and businesses across the nation by amassing information
about the calls of ordinary Americans.... Moreover, Seymour Hersh,
in The New Yorker, stated that the NSA, subsequent to its program of
collecting data about calls, "began to eavesdrop on callers (often using
computers to listen for key words) or to investigate them using tradi-
tional police methods.... 8 Computer searches are likely carried out
around key words and link analysis. '39
The information gathered in the NSA programs is then secretly
fed back into the established legal system of telecommunications sur-
veillance. According to James Risen, the Bush administration obtains
FISA court approval for wiretaps "in part on the basis of information
gathered from the earlier warrantless eavesdropping."'" Two of his
sources estimated that approximately 10 to 20 percent of the annual
FISA warrants are based on information garnered through the NSA
domestic surveillance program.' Thus, there may be several programs
in which the NSA is engaged in surveillance within the US, including
some in which data mining is used.
After claiming that its surveillance activity could not be made
compatible with FISA, the Bush administration changed course in
135 Id.
136 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA Today Al
(May 11, 2006) (reporting that the NSA was collecting phone records, though not listening to or
recording actual conversations). USA Today subsequently admitted that it could not confirm
BellSouth and Verizon participation in the NSA program. See Frank Ahrens and Howard Kurtz,
USA Today Takes Back Some of NSA Phone-record Report, Wash Post A02 (July 1, 2006) (not-
ing that "USA Today stood by much of its initial report, saying it had followed up with lawmak-
ers and intelligence and telecom sources").
137 Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database, USA Today at Al (cited in note 136).
138 Seymour M. Hersh, National Security Dept. Listening In, New Yorker 24, 25 (May 29,
2006) (charting the NSA's wiretapping activities from before FISA through to the present day).
139 See id (describing "'chaining,' in which subsequent calls to and from the American num-
ber were monitored and linked").
140 Risen, State of War at 54 (cited in note 127) (noting this method as one way "to cover up
the NSA's role in the domestic surveillance of people inside the United States").
141 Id.
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January 2007 and announced that it had brought at least one of its
surveillance programs under the FISC's supervision. "2 In May 2007,
Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, also informed
Congress that the Bush administration would not commit itself to con-
tinue seeking FISA warrants. 3 Then, at some time in the spring of
2007, a secret FISC decision raised roadblocks to the NSA's surveil-
lance activities." The FISC opinion was said to concern a NSA re-
quest for a so-called "basket warrant" under which the FISC was to
issue a warrant not on a case-by-case basis regarding specific suspects,
but more generally to cover surveillance activity involving multiple
targets.' 5 The Administration leaked information about this ruling,
made noises about the threat of imminent terrorist attacks, and pres-
sured Congress in August 2007 to enact the Protect America Act.
This statute will sunset after six months,' o which gives Congress a
chance to reconsider the matter. This reevaluation is desperately
needed; the Act creates an excessively broad carve-out from FISA that
allows the NSA access not only to foreign-to-foreign transit data, but
also to communications with a domestic component. The exceptions
threaten to swallow the rule; the carve-out in the Protect America Act
permits surveillance that will dwarf traditional FISA-regulated activities.
Electronic surveillance is freed of FISA constraints under the
Protect America Act if the surveillance is "directed at a person rea-
sonably believed to be located outside of the United States...4 7 Thus,
this telecommunications surveillance can sweep in communications
with a domestic component as long as the surveillance itself is not "di-
rected at" a person in the US, but a person abroad. The critical term,
"directed at," is not defined in the Act, but left to the attorney general
142 Eric Lichtblau and David Johnston, Court to Oversee US Wiretapping in Terror Cases,
NY Times Al (Jan 18, 2007) (reporting that the Justice Department had reached an arrangement
with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that would allow court approvals to be provided
with sufficient speed such that national security would not be compromised).
143 See James Risen, Administration Pulls Back on Surveillance Agreement, NY Times A18
(May 2,2007) (mentioning McConnell's claim that the Constitution authorized the president to
order warrantless wiretaps).
144 See Greg Miller, New Limits Put on Overseas Surveillance, LA Times A16 (Aug 2, 2007)
(noting that recent limitations on FISC-authorized eavesdropping have prompted new concerns
about national security); Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Behind the Surveillance
Debate, Newsweek Online Exclusive (Aug 1, 2007), online at http://www.newsweek.comid/32596
(visited Jan 12,2008) (examining the FISA judge's ruling to limit the NSA's eavesdropping capa-
bilities and the ruling's likely effects).
145 Miller, New Limits Put on Overseas Surveillance LA Times at A16 (cited in note 144).
One anonymous official was quoted as saying that the FISC ruling concerned cases "where one
end is foreign and you don't know where the other is." Id.
146 See Protect America Act of 2007 § 6(c), 120 Stat at 557, codified at 50 USCA § 1803 note.
147 50 USCA § 1805a.
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to shape through the creation of "reasonable procedures.....8 Note as
well that a link with an agent of a foreign power or terrorist is not
needed; rather, "a significant purpose of the acquisition" must merely
be "to obtain foreign intelligence information. '' ..
This law also permits the FISC a negligible role at best. It assigns
the FISC the task of issuing advisory opinions; this role raises signifi-
cant Article III questions. As for the substance, such as it is, of the ju-
dicial role, the attorney general is first to develop "reasonable proce-
dures ... for determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information ... concerns persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States."' Procedures are also to be developed for
minimization of the collection of nonpublic information about US
citizens-a similar requirement is already in place for FISA.'5' As
noted above, however, Wiretap Act statistics show that the minimiza-
tion under that statute has proven highly unsuccessful. The FISC then
evaluates whether the attorney general's determination regarding the
reasonableness of the procedures is "clearly erroneous. ..2
Finally, the Protect America Act's information structure is weak.
The attorney general is to inform four congressional committees on a
semi-annual basis of acquisitions made under the statute, including
incidents of noncompliance.' 3 This reporting provision is especially
problematic because of recently resigned Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales's record of evasive congressional testimony on multiple top-
ics, including, of particular relevance in this context, the administra-
tion's warrantless surveillance outside of FISA.1
In summary, a new era in telecommunications surveillance is un-
derway. A secret parallel system of telecommunications surveillance
exists, and information collected in it is fed back into the official sys-
tem in a fashion that leaves no traces. This system is built on secret
presidential authorizations; secret DOJ legal opinions; nonbinding
presidential promises; denials of security clearances to DOJ attorneys
to squelch internal investigations; an executive that refuses to provide
Congress and the public with necessary information; and, most re-
cently, acquiescent congressional legislation enacted in ignorance of
the true dimensions of NSA activities.
148 50 USCA § 1805b(a)(1).
149 50 USCA § 1805b(a)(4).
150 50 USCA § 1805b(a)(1).
151 50 USCA § 1805b(a)(5).
152 50 USCA § 1805c(b).
153 Patriot Reauthorization Act § 118, 120 Stat at 217-18.
154 As The Economist sarcastically explained regarding some of the Attorney General's
congressional testimony, "[P]erhaps Mr Gonzales is merely a weasel and not a perjurer." Alberto
Gonzales:A Visit to the Hospital, Economist 35 (Aug 4,2007).
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III. THE GROWTH IN BLANK SPACES, THE RISE OF
PRIVACY THEATER, AND TOWARDS THE REVIVAL OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE LAW
We began this essay with a quotation from Conrad about the
"blank spaces on the earth.".. On the domestic side, here has been a
significant movement in surveillance activity away from the capturing
of content pursuant to the Wiretap Act, which is the most carefully
regulated and reported-on area of telecommunications surveillance.
Of more importance today is the collection of telecommunications
attributes under the Pen Register Act and the Stored Communica-
tions Act. Yet, we lack access to any statistical data about activities
under the latter, and have less than full and up-to-date information
regarding the former.
At this juncture, one is reminded of Bruce Schneier's concept of
"security theater," which I wish to develop to include the idea of "pri-
vacy theater." According to Schneier, security theater is action that
seeks to increase our feeling of security without actually making us
safer. ' As an example, a requirement to show ID before entering an
office building, a common obligation in New York and other cities,
does nothing to increase our security against terrorists. As for privacy
theater, it seeks to heighten a feeling of privacy protection without
actually accomplishing anything substantive in this regard. As a prime
example, the DOJ occasionally sends information to Congress about
pen register activity, scholars dutifully and approvingly note this statu-
tory requirement, and then ... well, nothing happens. The information
disappears into a congressional void.
This demonstration of privacy theater shows a structuring of be-
havior that proves ineffectual. Yet, the payoff of this structure is
through its value as a ritual. Organization theory provides multiple
illustrations of the importance of rituals in organizing collective be-
havior. Organizations draw on and develop "vocabularies of struc-
ture" that help legitimize ends, and, in turn, entities that follow estab-
lished "myths of formal structure" demonstrate their fitness.' From
this perspective, the Wiretap Act established a useful organizational
model in 1968, and the Pen Register Act followed this information
structure in 1986. This privacy ritual involves recourse to a formal
155 See note 4 and accompanying text.
156 See Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain
World 38 (Copernicus 2003).
157 See John Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds, The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis 41, 50-51 (Chicago 1991) (discussing how "rationalized institutions
create myths of formal structure which shape organizations").
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structure for collection and transfer of statistical information about
telecommunications surveillance. In turn, FISA returned to this model
in 1978 by adopting its own reporting requirements.
The ritual creates and supports a myth-one of privacy oversight.
In the myth, the counting and tracking of law enforcement activity
implies that someone somewhere is drawing lessons from these statis-
tics and that the surveillance system, in turn, will be reformed if
needed. In contrast, the Stored Communications Act in 1986 deviated
from this model -the likely reason for its failure to draw on the estab-
lished myth was the uncertainty, still continuing to this day, regarding
the place of telecommunications attributes within the information
privacy landscape. It is also striking that so little has been done to im-
prove the collection and use of statistics about telecommunications
surveillance. The privacy oversight myth, nevertheless, persists.
As for the semi-known unknowns, this area of telecommunica-
tions surveillance presents a series of large blank spaces. There are
several secret NSA programs that were first subject only to impro-
vised legal processes and now have been granted a large, albeit tem-
porary, statutory carve-out from FISA by a Congress kept in the dark.
As Senator Jay Rockefeller, a member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, complained in September 2006, "I have been requesting
without success specific details about the program, including: how
many terrorists have been identified; how many arrested; how many
convicted; and how many terrorists have been deported or killed as a
direct result of information obtained through the warrantless wiretap-
ping program." ' At that time as well as today, "not one person in
Congress has the answers to these and many other fundamental ques-
tions... 9 One can recall another insight of Schneier's: "Secrecy con-
tributes to the 'trust us and we'll make the trade-offs for you' mental-
ity that ensures sloppy security systems.'' "
This essay concludes by considering two areas for reforms. The first
concerns foreign intelligence surveillance and the second concerns the
158 Senator Jay Rockefeller, Press Release, Rockefeller Says Administration Still Withhold-
ing Information on NSA Warrantless Surveillance Program (Sept 13, 2006), online at
http://www.senate.gov/-rockefeller/news/2006/prO91306.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
159 Id. More recently, some information has been shared with the congressional Intelligence
Committees, though it is reasonable to be skeptical about the extent of this disclosure. See Mark
Mazzetti, Key Lawmakers Getting Files about Surveillance Program, NY Times A12 (Feb 1, 2007)
(noting that select members of Congress had received secret documents relating to the NSA's
domestic eavesdropping program). The New York Times's editorial board has called for Presi-
dent Bush to turn over documents about the warrantless spying program to Congress and to
share the FISC opinion on the government's surveillance with the public. Editorial, The Need to
Know, NY Times A14 (Aug 11, 2007) (remarking on the problems inherent with the Protect
America Act's lack of privacy protections).
160 Schneier, Beyond Fear at 279 (cited in note 156).
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statistics about telecommunications surveillance in the US. The goal is
to break out of the ritual of "privacy theater"; specifically, the need is to
create strong congressional oversight, meaningful discussion within the
executive branch itself, and informed public debate. An improvement in
the quality and quantity of information will serve these aims.
The first area of reform concerns the NSA surveillance programs
and the NSLs. The NSA activities undermined the previous legal
framework for telecommunications surveillance law. In the words of
the bipartisan Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in
the Information Age, the current need is for a restoration of "intra-
governmental and public confidence that articulated rules are being
followed" in "a publicly-established framework agreed upon by the
executive branch and Congress..6. The Protect America Act does not
represent a successful attempt to establish a framework that will re-
store such confidence- Congress legislated from a position of igno-
rance as to executive branch activities, and there is only uncertainty as
to how and whether its provisions will be followed. Its narrowing of
FISC's role is especially problematic.
The Protect America Act should be replaced by a statute that
only authorizes a carve-out for foreign transit data and that provides a
robust role for FISC oversight. Beyond that, the issue of data mining
involving domestic communications raises complex and controversial
issues-and, here, blue ribbon panels and scholarship already have
begun to point to how this technique can be used in a fashion consis-
tent with the rule of law. 62
More information can be gained through auditing of NSA activi-
ties. On a promising note, Congress demonstrated in 2006 the poten-
tial for improvements in this area by creating both an NSL reporting
requirement and an inspector general audit obligation for NSL use.
On a unpromising note, Congress backslid in 2007 in enacting the Pro-
tect America Act, which permits open-ended, unaudited reports to be
filed with it by the attorney general. In contrast, a competing House
bill required the inspector general to audit compliance with the guide-
lines for cases involving surveillance of a US citizen as well as "the
161 Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, Mobilizing
Information to Prevent Terrorism: Accelerating Development of a Trusted Information Sharing
Environment 22 (July 2006), online at http://www.markle.org/downloadable-assets/2006_nstf_
report3.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
162 For a summary, see generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee, and Paul M. Schwartz,
Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U
Chi L Rev 261 (2008).
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number of persons in the United States whose communications" were
intercepted. ""
As for the Inspector General audit of NSLs, it revealed a need for
ongoing oversight of the FBI's use of these extrajudicial searches as
well as reform of current NSL provisions. Here, a good start would be
to modify the overarching "gag rules" to allow disclosure in most cir-
cumstances once ongoing telecommunications surveillance ends.
Beyond the NSA and NSL surveillance, Congress should revise
the existing statutory models for gathering statistics. Its goal should be
to improve the information structure of this area of law by creating an
annual telecommunications surveillance index. Instead of the bits and
pieces of scattered reports released each year, Congress should create
one annual report card that measures and publicizes government's
performance in this area. As Neal Katyal has stated, "[r]eporting re-
quirements are powerful devices" that promote external checks by
Congress as well as strengthening bureaucrats in administrative agen-
cies, who can act as a check on excessive executive power.16
There are five steps that Congress should take towards the crea-
tion of this index. First, the respective telecommunications surveil-
lance statutes should be amended so the Administrative Office re-
ceives copies of all telecommunications surveillance statistics collected
pursuant to statute. Since 1968, the Administrative Office has demon-
strated its ability to collect and release such information and analysis.
The Administrative Office should prepare its own analysis of these
statistics as it has done for Wiretap Act information. As a first step
towards this goal, the Pen Register Act should be amended so report-
ing under it is made to the Administrative Office.
Second, the annual index should include information about law
enforcement activity under the Stored Communications Act. In 2000,
the House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on a bill contain-
ing provisions for reporting on government access to information un-
der the Stored Communications Act. The House Report on that bill
noted the lack of "publicly available data on which to base" an as-
sessment of the "effects of governmental access to e-mail and other
163 Improving Foreign intelligence Surveillance to Defend the Nation and the Constitution
Act of 2007, HR 3356, 110th Cong, 1st Sess, in 153 Cong Rec H 9685 (Aug 3,2007). This bill also
required FISC approval of each application for electronic surveillance under it. Id. For a previ-
ous bill that would have more narrowly amended FISA to permit NSA access to foreign transit
data, see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S 3877,
109th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 7,2006). See also Editorial, Spying on Americans, NY Times A20 (May
2,2007) ("[Senator Diane Feinsteinl offered some sensible changes for FISA, but the administra-
tion and the Republican majority in the last Congress buried her bill.").
164 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2341-42 (2006).
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computer communications...6. The bill's reporting requirements would
roughly track those of the Pen Register Act's provisions. '6
Third, the annual index should include expanded information
about government activity under FISA. For example, Peter Swire ad-
vocates "greater reporting to Congress and the public on how FISA is
used in criminal cases."1 67 The Wiretap Act offers a useful model in this
regard; it requires reports on the number of prosecutions and convic-
tions. Swire suggests, moreover, that to the extent that new legal ar-
guments are presented to the FISA court, this information should be
made public.'8 In addition, as part of a sorely needed revisiting of the
Protect America Act before it sunsets, Congress should adopt a system
for collecting information about the annual number of "certifications
and directives issued" under the statute's carve-out from the FISA
warrant requirements as well as the number of US persons whose
communications were intercepted.
Fourth, the idea of an annual index requires harmonization of the
information collected. The goal should be to give a clear picture of
how activities in different statutory areas relate to one another. Exist-
ing reporting requirements should also be tweaked to improve their
quality. A few examples will suffice. FISA should be amended to sepa-
rate statistics for physical and electronic searches. Wiretap Act reports
should include information about the number of connections placed
under surveillance per year, and not merely the number of orders.
Moreover, Wiretap Act reports should require jurisdictions that have
no activity in a given year to file a report with it. Such filing will insure
that a zero for the jurisdiction reflects no surveillance activity, rather
than a report never sent to the Administrative Office.
Fifth, there should be audit functions under telecommunications
surveillance statutes. As an example, the Pentagon's Technology and
Privacy Advisory Committee called in 2004 for annual audits of any
data mining programs involving personal information of US citizens.
' 6
165 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, HR Rep No 106-932, 106th Cong, 2d
Sess 10 (2000) (lamenting that there was little data with which to understand the effects of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986).
166 See id (annual required reporting included: the fact that an order was applied for, the
type of order applied for, whether the order was granted, the predicate offense, and the agency
applying for the order).
167 Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 Geo Wash L Rev
1306,1367 (2004).
168 See id.
169 DOD, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight
against Terrorism 52 (Mar 2004), online at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf
(visited Jan 12, 2008) (recommending that the government adopt additional privacy precautions
when collecting private data, and suggesting that these additional precautions will eventually aid
various agencies in protecting national security).
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There should also be independent investigation of law enforcement
activities under the other statutes.
CONCLUSION
In 1967, one year before enactment of the Wiretap Act, the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice warned of the risks of unregulated governmental surveillance. The
Commission stated, "In a democratic society privacy of communica-
tion is essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and construc-
tively.' ' 0 This warning has the even greater resonance today-the
amount of personal data that individuals generate now is vastly
greater than in 1967. The legal structure for regulating telecommuni-
cations surveillance by the government should be reformed. This essay
has described areas for needed attention and suggested an initial set
of needed steps.
170 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 (GPO 1967).
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